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PUBLIC HOUSING IN ITSELF
JUSTIFIES USE VARIANCE
An Englewood, New Jersey, Baptist Church formed a corporation
for the purpose of constructing public housing in the city of Engle-
wood. The corporation planned to build low to medium income
apartments to provide relocation housing for residents displaced by
clearing and rehabilitation in the fourth ward of the city, an area
characterized as a ghetto. The only feasible location within the city
was in the second ward, a middle class residential area. Upon appli-
cation by the corporation, the city board of adjustment granted size
and use variances which were required because apartment construction
conflicted with the zoning classification of the area. Residents within
the second ward brought five actions challenging the variances, the
ground lease, and the action of the planning board approving the
site. The trial court found for the defendants; the Supreme Court of
New Jersey affirmed in DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing
Corporation.,
The primary holding of the case, that, as a matter of law, a properly
demonstrated need for public housing justifies granting of variances, 2
is based on New Jersey statute § 40:55-39, which reads:
The board of adjustment shall have the power to... d. Recom-
mend in particular cases and for special reasons to the governing
body of the municipality the granting of a variance to allow a
structure or use in a district restricted against such structure or
use.3 (Emphasis added) [Hereinafter referred to as "d" or "spe-
cial reasons" variance.]
The broadest construction of this statute before DeSimone is con-
tained in Ward v. Scott,4 which upheld the constitutionality of the
statute. The applicant for the variance in Ward wanted to have off-
street parking for a commercial building in a residential area. The
court held that an applicant for a variance did not have to show
hardship,5 or undue burden on him and the conduct of his business
1. 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
2. Id. at 434, 267 A.2d at 37.
3. N.J. STAT. Am;. § 40:55-39 (Supp. 1971).
4. 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952).
5. Id. at 122, 93 A.2d at 387.
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because of the zoning ordinance. Instead, the applicant need only show
good cause for granting of a variance, and the board of adjustment will
consider whether that cause is sufficient to allow the variance. Conse-
quently, hardship, or burden on the applicant, is not the sole criterion
for granting variances. This case set New Jersey apart from other states
on the issue of zoning variances; court decisionse and statutes7 in
other states often specifically require an affirmative showing of hard-
ship as the principal factor to be considered in administrative de-
termination of whether to grant variances.
After Ward, the New Jersey courts retreated somewhat from their
liberalization of the factors to be considered in granting variances.8
A return to the Ward position came in Andrews v. Ocean Township
Board of Adjustment,9 in which the court held that hardship was not
the sole reason for allowing variances, and permitted a church-operated
parochial school with living facilities for teachers in a residential
6. See, e.g., Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 35 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1963) (driveway in residential subdivision to rest home in different subdivi-
sion; variance granted on grounds of hardship); Parson v. Board of Zoning Ap-
peals, 140 Conn. 290, 99 A.2d 149 (1953) (basement and two floors of building
for doctor's office in area zoned for single-family residences; hardship variance
granted); Searles v. Darling, 46 Del. 263, 83 A.2d 96 (1951) (apartment house
in residential zone; evidence failed to show hardship); Lovely v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 259 A.2d 666 (Me. 1969) (grocery store in agricultural zone; evidence
held not to sustain burden of proof of hardship); Gelinas v. City of Portsmouth,
97 N.H. 248, 85 A.2d 896 (1952) (gas station in residential zone; granted on
adequate showing of hardship); Brown v. Fraser, 467 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1970)
(residence on less than minimum size lot; denied, no hardship); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (narrow holding was that failure to provide
for apartments in a township was unconstitutional; hardship discussed); Sylvester
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 398 Pa. 216, 157 A.2d 174 (1959) (apartments in
area zoned for one- and two-family dwellings, denied because hardship not shown);
Tavares v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 103 R.I. 186, 235 A.2d 883 (1967) (change of
use from residential to commercial; held beyond power of zoning board of review);
Bartlett v. City of Corpus Christi, 359 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (food
processing plant in area zoned for light industry; fact issue precluded summary
judgment for city in suit to restrain; hardship discussed); Azalea Corp. v. City of
Richmond, 201 Va. 636, 112 S.E.2d 862 (1960) (driveways across land in city to
provide access to land in county; held arbitrary and unreasonable to refuse the
variance).
7. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 327(a) (3) (Supp. 1970); ME. Ray.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4954(2) (A) (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912
(Supp. 1971).
8. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Pozner, 21 N.J. 199, 121 A.2d 527 (1956), overruled in
Black v. Town of Montclair, 34 N.J. 105, 167 A.2d 388 (1961); Cunningham,
Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 37,
87 (1959).
9. 30 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 580 (1959).
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area.' 0 Since Andrews, there has been no substantial change in New
Jersey court treatment of "d" variances, whether denied or granted
by the appropriate administrative body." This is not to say that the
courts have always upheld the actions of administrative bodies whether
they denied or granted variances, but that the courts of New Jersey
have not returned to their position of granting variances only when
the applicant demonstrates hardship.
DeSimone represents more than a repetition of the holdings and
reasoning in Andrews and Ward. Prior to DeSimone no New Jersey
court held that specific factors such as "social goals" and policy per se
were sufficient to qualify as "special reasons." DeSimone involved
public housing, a "social goal," and the court held public housing to
be a sufficient "special reason" to justify a variance, as a matter of
law. 2 The court did not hold that a need for public housing was
sufficient as a matter of fact, in terms of this case and its particular
facts alone; it held that a need for public housing was sufficient as a
matter of law. An identified "social goal" has thus been defined as
legally sufficient to satisfy the terms of the statute; a "social goal" is a
"special reason." In other states, an applicant for a variance must
show hardship to himself which has occurred because of the zoning
ordinance; 3 nowhere are specific criteria held as a matter of law
sufficient to constitute hardship so as to allow the variance.
On reading the opinion in DeSirnone, one is struck by the charac-
terization of the arguments of the plaintiffs as "frivolous"'14 and
"harassment.""is Although courts will often make the position and
arguments of the non-prevailing party appear naive and ill-founded,
they do not very often characterize them as harshly as they did here.
This characterization seems to indicate the court's concern for New
Jersey's housing problems and its dislike of objections to the housing
project.
The DeSimone court did not emphasize the fact that the Englewood
project involved relocation housing, perhaps because that aspect of
the project was not questioned. However, the findings of the trial
10. Id. at 248-49, 152 A.2d at 583.
11. See, e.g., Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 225 A.2d 321 (1966) ; Mullin v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 85 N.J. Super. 180, 204 A.2d 225 (App. Div. 1964);
Miller v. Board of Adjustment, 67 N.J. Super. 460, 171 A.2d 8 (App. Div. 1961).
12. 56 N.J. at 442, 267 A.2d at 38.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. 56 N.J. at 439, 267 A.2d at 36.
15. Id. at 444, 267 A.2d at 39.
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court and the board of adjustment showed that without this reloca-
tion housing in the second ward, the city would not be able to clear
and rehabilitate its fourth ward ghetto.- In view of this fact find-
ing and the court's broad holding, the relocation argument becomes
critical: without relocation housing, there would be no housing
project for Englewood because the city could not clear and rehabilitate
its fourth ward ghetto without providing housing for persons dis-
placed by the project. The facts of the Englewood situation 17 thus
lend themselves very well to the court's broad holding.
DeSimone is, moreover, a departure from a 1945 New Jersey Su-
preme Court decision, Potts v. Board of Adjustment,'8 which might
be construed as authority against the court's decision in DeSimone.
Potts held, inter alia, that need for public housing was not sufficient
to allow a variance to be granted, although the plaintiff had alleged
a "need" for public housing.29 However, Potts can be distinguished
from DeSimone because the plaintiff in Potts requested a variance
permitting a single-family dwelling; there was no large-scale public
housing project involved. The cases are also distinguishable because
the statute involved in Potts is a different, although similar, part of
the statute on which DeSimone is based;20 it allows variances to be
granted for "special exceptions." In addition, the broad holding was
not necessary to the decision in Potts. DeSimone does not mention
Potts, although plaintiffs in DeSimone cited Potts in their brief and
attempted to get the court to apply that holding to the facts here.2
In analyzing DeSimone one should consider Bern v. Borough of Fair
Lawn, 22 which dealt with the location of car-washing stations in an
16. Brief for Defendant-Respondent Greater Englewood Housing Corporation at
5, DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corporation, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d
31 (1970).
17. 56 N.J. at 435, 267 A.2d at 37.
18. 133 N.J.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (App. Div. 1945). Two other jurisdictions, in
cases decided about the same time, agreed with Potts: Wilkins v. City of San
Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); County Comrn'r v. Ward, 186
Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1945).
19. 133 N.J.L. at 234-35, 43 A.2d at 855.
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39(b) (Supp. 1971):
b. Hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such ordi-
nance, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map or for
decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is authorized
by any such ordinance to pass.
21. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing
Corporation, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
22. 65 N.J. Super. 435, 168 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1960).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1972/iss1/19
PUBLIC HOUSING
area zoned for business uses. The Bern court held that it was beyond
the competence of the board of adjustment to declare that the car-
washing stations had to be located more than 1,000 feet from churches
and theatres.23 The court also held that for a variance to be granted,
the "negative criteria" of the statute had to be satisfied: 2'
No relief may be granted or action taken under the terms of this
section unless such relief can be granted without substantial
detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair
the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.25
In other words, an applicant for a variance has to show a "special
reason," and that the variance will not impair the intent and purpose
of the zoning ordinance and will not be a detriment to the public
good. In DeSimone, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had not
satisfied the conditions of city ordinances relating to the zoning plan,
that the physical layout of the project site was not particularly con-
ducive to public housing, and that technical details as to utilities had
not been resolved in the final plat of the project area; 28 however,
these arguments were rejected by the court as harassment. 27 As to the
utilities, a recent New York case28 held that a showing that no ade-
quate sewage facilities were available was sufficient to deny the grant-
ing of a variance. From these considerations, and the treatment of
plaintiffs' arguments, one may conclude that the New Jersey Supreme
Court was extremely concerned with the public policy favoring con-
struction of public housing in areas where needed. In view of the
broad holding in DeSimone, and the New Jersey "special reasons"
statute as interpreted by its courts, one may look for more New Jersey
decisions holding specific, factually-based goals sufficient by themselves
to justify "special reasons" variances, as public housing was in De-
Simone.
New Jersey is still alone in its "special reasons" statutory provision,
and the New Jersey Supreme Court seems to have taken judicial
notice of the need for public housing; this is more than other state
courts have done at this point. 'When findings like those in Engle-
23. Id. at 450, 451, 168 A.2d at 61, 62.
24. Id. at 447, 168 A.2d at 59.
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39 (Supp. 1971).
26. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing
Corporation, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
27. 56 N.J. at 444, 267 A.2d at 39.
28. Carnet Realty, Inc., v. Barnett, 33 App. Div. 2d 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d (1969).
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wood are made,29 the New Jersey Supreme Court will not hesitate to
allow housing to proceed despite technical difficulties. The court
prefers to resolve cases involving public needs in favor of the pro-
ponent authority unless there is clear abuse of discretion by that
authority.30 The power of city boards of adjustments, is thus given
strong authority when they are backed up by such courts as the New
Jersey Supreme Court.
Max J. Ruttger III
29. 56 N.J. at 434, 267 A.2d at 37.
30. E.g., Tzeses v. Board of Trustees, 22 N.J. Super. 45, 91 A.2d 588 (App. Div.
1952).
31. See, e.g., Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Admin-
istration, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 60, 66.
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